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Abstract
For contemporary legal theory, law is essentially an interpretative and hermeneutic practice
(Ackerman (1991), Horwitz (1992)). A straightforward consequence is that legal disputes
between parties are motivated by their divergent interpretations regarding what law says on
their case. This point of view fits well the growing evidence showing that litigants’ cognitive
performances display the optimistic bias or self-serving bias (Babcock and Lowenstein (1997)).
This paper provides a theoretical analysis of the influence of such a cognitive bias on pretrial
negotiations. However, we also consider that this effetcs is mitigated because of litigants’
confidence about their own ability to predict the verdict; we model this issue assuming that
litigants are risk averse in the sense of Yaari (1987), i.e. they display a kind of (rational)
probability distorsion which is also well documented in experimantal economics. In a model à la
Bebcuck (1984), we show that the consequences of the self-serving bias are partially consistent
with the "optimistic model", but that parties’ risk aversion has more ambiguous/unpredictable
effects. These results contribute to explain that the believes about the result of the trial are
not sufficient by themselves to understand the behaviors of litigants. As suggested by legal
theory, the confidence the parties have in their believes is probably more important.
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1 Introduction
The resolution of legal conflicts is an important topic in Law and Economics. Models relating to
the outcome of trials attempt to describe and explain the choice of the parties between litigation
and settlement. The ambition is to evaluate the consequences of strategic interactions between
parties, rendered even more complex as one of the litigants may hold private information or present
characteristics the other party cannot observe. The approach supposes that the courts role consists
in identifying ex post an optimal allocation (i.e. after the apparition of the dispute). This is
the position taken by Posner (1992) when he considers that the court’s role is to “mimic” the
transaction at zero cost. However, before the judge’s decision intervenes there are several stages
to be covered, each requiring a decision on the part of litigants. The first representations of
litigation (Landes (1972), Gould (1973)) did not really aim to describe the negotiations which may
have occurred before the judge’s decision. The aim was rather to identify the incentives of the
parties in their quality of rational agents to solve a dispute and explain why negotiations fail in
certain cases, thus requiring the intervention of a judge. The answer to this question comes from
an excess of optimism on behalf of the parties concerning their chances of winning the trial, i.e.
a misperception of the surplus emanating from negotiation. Even though these models do give a
reasonably convincing explanation of how disputes are settled out of the court, they remain vague as
to the way in which litigants are over-optimistic. From this point of view, strategic models propose
a richer description of legal process whether or not it arrives at an agreement between the parties.
The strategic nature of negotiation between litigants has been generally captured with games under
imperfect information. Informational asymmetry produces differences in beliefs as to the outcome
of a trial and final decisions may be the result of optimal strategies by the litigants (P’ng (1984) ;
Bebchuck (1984); Nalebuff (1987)). In this way, pretrial negotiation may also break down because
parties fail to agree on how to split the surplus accruing from settlement (Cooter, Marks and
Mnookin (1982)); such failure can also be derived from asymmetric information on each other’s
barganing power (Farmer and Pecorino (1994,2002)). A different reason why parties’expectations
may diverge emerges from experimental evidence, pointing to the fact that disputants make self-
serving valuations of their probability to win the case. There is a systematic tendency for one
to believe to have better chances than his or her counterpart (Loewenstein, Issacharo, Camerer,
and Babcock (1993)). Bar-Gill (2006) justifies the persistence of biased beliefs as an evolutionary
stable equilibrium.
However, some problems remain. From an empirical point of view, the diversity of situations
is quite puzzling. It is difficult to explain why so few settlements take place in certain field of law
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(e.g. labor litigation) compared with other civil litigations whereas there is no significant difference
concerning informational asymmetries. The topic of the paper is to investigate the reasons why
settlement may fail in pretrial negotiation in such a context. Obviously, settlements suppose that
parties reach an agreement before the trial. As such, respective risk attitudes of the parties play
a important role in the willingness of the plaintiff to accept or reject the offer proposed by the
defendant. This is a key-element on which literature in Law and Economics insists.
The originality of the paper is to add another dimension, namely the self-serving bias. The
decision, for the plaintiff, to accept or reject settlement crucially depends on the representation he
has about his probability to win or to lose his case. More specifically, the heart of the litigation
process is certainly the way the judge will decide the case. In other words, it is crucial to focus
on the manner by which the judge will interpret existing legal text and law to solve the case.
More precisely, we consider that the litigation may be understood as a conflict between different
individual judgments about the interpratation of the law by the courts. Using the terminology of
the decision theory, litigation comes mainly from different expectations about the case.
From the legal theorists perspective, the true nature of a legal dispute is due to the fact that
parties make some divergent interpretations about what law says. By insisting on this feature, we
hold the point of view of the contemporary legal theory which considers law as an interpretative and
hermeneutic practice. There are a lot of reasons why divergent interpretations may arise. This is
the case notably because legal rules are never clear by themselves. And contemporary legal theorists
acknowledges that law is deeply an interpretative process (Ackerman (1991); Horwitz (1992)): the
topics of the methods of interpretation, the nature of interpretation and the consequences of the
judges ability to attribute - or to determine - a specific meaning to a law are now the heart of
the legal theory (Rosenfeld (1998)). Economists interested in legal problems need to take account
this feature to analyze litigation: it is precisely because the meaning of a norm needs to be rebuilt
by judiciary that conflict may arises. What we call interpretation in law is the other face of the
cognitive problem for the parties to assess the probability he will win the case. As litigation results
from divergent legal interpretations of the case, litigation in economics results from divergent
expectations about the chance to win. We consider that interpretational issues in law are the twin
aspect of cognitive aspect in economics. That is why we introduce a self-serving bias in our model
in order to capture the fact that interpretation is never clear and that parties may fail to perfectly
interpret the law. The problem is different from those considered in “strategic models” because
the problem is not with informational asymmetries between litigants but with the interpretative
mechanism of the courts. In a way, we are going back to the “optimistic approach” developed
by Posner. Here, biases are considered as describing a twofold process: the one by which people
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interpret the law and the one by which people make their expectations about legal decision. The
aim of the paper is to put the stress on the different effects of self-serving bias - that is to say - a
bias in the interpretation of the meaning of the law.
This approach is original because it puts the emphasis not only on the parties’ beliefs about the
result of the trial, but on the faith they have in these beliefs. This is the great interest of the debates
introduced by legal theory to consider the interpretative process. The problem cannot simply be
defined in terms of optimism or pessimism. Of course the question of judicial interpretation refers
clearly to the activity of the judge1 . However a common interpretation of a legal rule generally
emerges from the interaction between the judges and the parties. Consequently, it is crucial to
appreciate if the problems of confidence or error’s aversion may modify the conclusions of the
economic models built on the simple hypothesis of litigant’s optimism.
To investigate this problem, we use the dual theory of Yaari (1987) which provides us with
sound, axiomatically founded but simple arguments to rationalize another channel for the dis-
agreement between individuals’ beliefs: these are not pure probabilistic decision weights, but re-
flect the preferences of the individuals and specifically their attitude towards risk which is termed
probabilistic risk aversion. In other words, parties are characterized by some objective information
(probabilistic) with regards to the interpretation of the law by the judge that they use in assess-
ing their own individual beliefs, but this information is distorted according to their risk aversion,
since litigants also take into account that they may make mistakes. Decidue and Wakker (2001)
as Weber and Kirsner (1997) rationalize such a probability transformation process, as reflecting
that individuals take into account and minimize the loss, disappointment or pain they will suffer
when making an error in the assessment of the outcome associated with their decisions. In a sense,
probabilistic risk aversion reflects the degree of confidence of an individual regarding his priors
and his ability to take the best decision; while the self-serving bias is supported by a theory of
self-manipulation of beliefs reflecting that, even if they have the true and objective information
about the situation, individuals are prone (more or less deliberately) to reinterpret the facts in a
way favorable to themselves.
The paper is organized as follow. In a second part, we propose a model of litigation which
is mainly a model à la Bebchuk. But we assume that the plaintiff is both risk-adverse and bear
a cognitive bias concerning his own case, a self-serving bias. In the third part, we analyze the
comparative statics of the model in order to discriminate the effects due to self-serving bias from
those due to risk-aversion. Our findings are quite different from those of Pecorino and Farmer
1Moreover, Ichino, Polo and Rettore (2003), Marinescu (2007) and Viscusi (2001) give evidence on Courts and
jurys biases of several kinds.
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(2002), and in a sense confirm that the order of play between party is important for the influence
of their respective cognitive bias. We also find that changes in the possible plaintiff’ types have
effects that Bebchuck (1984) seminal work cannot capture, thus showing the importance of both
congnitive bias and risk aversion to have a more comprehensive view on the litigation process.
2 The model
The Bebchuk’s model (1984) is modified in the following way. We consider a plaintiff which is hurt
by an accident that may be the result of negligence or wrongdoings by another party, the defendant.
The loss supported by the plaintiff in case of accident is D > 0. It corresponds to the damages
awarded by the court if the plaintiff wins the case. The compensation D is a public information.
Nevertheless, p the probability that the judgment at trial be in favour of the victim is a private
information (p is the type of the plaintiff). We assume that the defendant only knows that2
p ∈ [a, b] and is distributed according to a probability function characterized by the cumulative
function G(p) and the density g(p), which are public information. In order to rule out secondary
difficulties, we introduce the following assumption:
Assumption 1: the rate of hazard G
g
is increasing.
Such an assumption allows both that the second order condition is verified and that the equi-
librium is unique.
2.1 assumptions about the preferences of the parties
On the one hand, we assume that the plaintiff displays a self-serving bias (σp > 1) and thus has
an assessement of the prior corresponding to his chances to win at trial denoted σpp which is
larger than his true probability. In other word, the plaintiff interprets the facts of the case as more
favorable for himself than they really are from an objective point of view. On the second, the
plaintiff has preferences which satisfy the axiomatics of Yaari’s model (Yaari (1987)); thus, there
exists a probability transformation function ϕ(p) which is endowed with the basic properties that
ϕ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is unique, continuous and increasing in p, with ϕ(0) = 0 and ϕ(1) = 1. We will
assume that ϕ(p) is (at least twice) differentiable, with:
Assumption 2: ∀p ∈ [0, 1] : ϕ′′(p) > 0.
2We assume that a > 0 in order to rule out the case of frivolous suits, and b < 1.
5
which simply says that the plaintiff is a probabilistic risk averse decision maker (which is
equivalent to risk averse d.m. in the strong sense of Rothschild-Stiglitz: see Yaari (1987)). Given
the presence of the plaintiff’s self-serving bias, the anticipated utility of the plaintiff of type p in
case of trial corresponding to a prospect Xp = (x1, 1− p;x2, p), with x1 < x2, is written:
Eϕop(Xp;σp) ≡ (1− ϕ (σpp))x1 + ϕ (σpp)x2
In words, Eϕop(Xp;σp) is the subjectively transformed expected outcome at trial, since the prob-
ability of each outcome at trial is replaced by a subjective weight of likelihood, namely the trans-
formation of its prior. Specifically, according to the convexity of ϕ(p), the plaintiff assesses a
weight of likelihood to the worst (best) outcome at trial which is larger (smaller) than its prior :
i.e. 1 − ϕ(σpp) > 1 − σpp (respectively ϕ(σpp) < σpp). Interestingly enough, Eϕop(Xp;σp) also
provides us with the certainty-equivalent of the risky prospect at trial X (see Roëll (1987) and
Yaari (1987)), or equivalently his willingness to pay for the risk at trial, but expressed in the terms
of the prior.
Finally, we consider here that the defendant is a risk neutral individual, but also displays a
self-serving bias denoted by σd < 1; this implies that facing the risky prospect of trial Xp =
(x1, 1− p;x2, p), the defendant’s expected outcome is E(Xp;σd) ≡ (1− σdp)x1 + σdpx2.
We will focus on the case where (σp, σd) are public information.
2.2 the pretrial negotiation game
The negotiation game has two main stages, after that Nature has choosen the type of the plaintiff
p in [a, b], and after that the plaintiff has sued his case:
- In a first stage, the defendant makes a "take-it-or-leave-it" offer to the plaintiff, denoted s, in
order to reach a amicable settlement of the case.
- In the second stage, depending on his type, the plaintiff accepts the offer (thus, the case is
settled) or rejects it, in which case parties go to trial.
The american rule is introduced to describe the allocation of the costs borne by each parties at
trial. We denote: Cp > 0 the plaintiff’s costs and Cd > 0 the defendant’s costs.
Formally, the p plaintiff’s anticipated utility in case of trial corresponding to the prospect
Xp = (D −Cp, p;−Cp, 1− p), is written:
Eϕop(Xp;σp) ≡ ϕ(σpp)D −Cp
We suppose that σpaD − Cp > 0 meaning that the weakest type for the plaintiff, i.e. when
he knows to be facing the defendant having the best chances to be seen as not liable by the
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Court, always has an incentive to go to trial. Nevertheless, given that the plaintiff is a risk averse
individual, he will not always go to trial since for all p: Eϕop(Xp;σp) < σppD−Cp.
On the defendant side, the risky trial is a prospect denoted Xd = (−(D + Cd), p;−Cd, 1− p),
and the anticipated loss borne by the defendant when he faces a type p for the plaintiff at trial is:
E(−Xd;σd) ≡ σdpD +Cd
Finally, we consider situations where D > Cp+Cd implying that the case to be solved is socially
worth (i.e. we exclude the case for frivolous suits).
2.3 the separating equilibrium
The equilibrium is described in terms of the amount for which the parties settle s (the equilibrium
offer of the defendant to the plaintiff) and of the probability of a trial corresponding to the marginal
plaintiff p(s), the one who is indifferent between accepting the offer or rejecting it and going to
trial.
In the second stage, the plaintiff p choses between a sure prospect: to accept the offer s, and a
risky prospect: going to trial Xp, the certainty-equivalent of which is ϕ(σpp)D− Cp. As a result,
plaintiff p accepts the offer s soon as: s ≥ ϕ(σpp)D − Cp. Otherwise, he rejects it. Let us denote
as p(s) the marginal plaintiff that is, the one who is indifferent between both prospects:
ϕ(σpp(s))D −Cp = s (1)
Given the existence of the self-serving bias σp, any plaintiff having a case weaker than the
marginal plaintiff (any p < p(s)) also accepts the offer, while any plaintiff having a stronger case
(p > p(s)) goes to trial.
Coming back to the first stage, we are allowed to write the loss function according to which
the defendant will set his best offer. With probability G (p(s)), the defendant knows he will face a
plaintiff prone to accept his offer, and thus bear the cost s to settle the case. But with probability
1−G (p(s)), the defendant knows he will face a case stronger than the marginal one, and thus will
have to bear the cost σd
(∫ b
p(s) p
g(p)
1−G(p(s))dp
)
D+ Cd ≡ E(Xd;σd|p > p(s)) to solve the case. The
term
∫ b
p(s)
p
g(p)
1−G(p(s))dp ≡ µ(s) denotes the mean type of the plaintiff conditional to the population
having rejected the amicable offer and going to trial. The defendant will anounce the best offer
sˆ ≥ 0, which minimize the loss function:
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L (s) = G (p(s))× s+ (1−G (p(s)))×E(Xd;σd|p > p(s))
= s+ (1−G (p(s)))× (E(Xd;σd|p > p(s))− s) (2)
under the condition (1). The second line in (2) may be understood as follows: the defendant
starts with the expenditure he would undertake in case of settlement, and then he assesses the
additional costs he would bear in case of trial, weighted by the probability of a trial.
We obtain the first proposition:
Proposition 1:
In an interior equilibrium, the offer sˆ and the marginal plaintiff pˆ are set according to the
following conditions:
sˆ = ϕ(σppˆ)D−Cp (3)(
G
g
)
|pˆ
=
1
ϕ′(σppˆ)
(
σd
σp
pˆ
(
1−
ϕ(σppˆ)
σdpˆ
)
+
C
σpD
)
(4)
where C ≡ Cp +Cd, such that the probability of a trial is pˆi = 1−G(pˆ).
Proof: If sˆ > 0 and pˆ ∈]p˜, b[ are an admissible interior solution for the minimization of (2), then
the First Order Condition writes as:
G (pˆ)− g (pˆ)
1
σpϕ′(σppˆ)D
((σdpˆ− ϕ(σppˆ))D+Cp +Cd) = 0 (5)
The first LHS term in (5) is the marginal cost of the defendant’s offer: raising the offer leads to
an increase in the loss incured by the defendant equal to the probability of settlement. The second
LHS term in (5) is the marginal benefit of the offer which may be splet in two components:
- on the one hand, the effect of raising the offer on the probability of trial, d
ds
(1 −G(p(s)) =
−g (pˆ) 1
σpϕ′(σppˆ)D
; this term reflects the efficiency of the screening of the various plaintiff’s types
due to an increase in the settlement offer;
- on the other hand, the gains of the negotiation3 at the marginal plaintiff (σdpˆ− ϕ(σppˆ))D+
(Cp+Cd); this one obviously reflects the gain associated to the screening of the plaintiffs according
to their type.
3Were the parties both risk neutral and having no self-serving bias, these gains would be reduced to the aggregate
transaction costs of a trial : Cp +Cd. But, as the parties do not have the same perception of the risk of a trial (on
the one hand, they have different priors; on the second they do not have the same sensibility to risk) the negotiation
gains are different from the transaction costs of a trial: E(Xd;σd|p > p(s))− s = Cp + Cd ⇔ σdpˆ− ϕ(σppˆ) = 0.
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Rearranging the various terms leads to (4).
Let us give a brief sketch of the conditions under which (3)-(4) have a unique solution.
Remark that under assumption 1, the LHS in (4) is an increasing function of p. However under
assumption 2, the RHS is not (necessarily) a monotonically decreasing function of p: thus, there
may exist several extrema (several values of p satisfying (4) with their associated offer satisfying
(2)). When this is the case, inspection of the second order condition which requires that the
marginal cost of the offer increases more than its marginal benefit (or: L′′(s) ≥ 0):
(
G
g
)′
|pˆ
+
(
G
g
)
|pˆ
×
(
ϕ′′
ϕ′
)
|(σppˆ)
× σp + 1−
1
ϕ′(σppˆ)
σd
σp
≥ 0
enables us to indentiy which ones of those extrema are local minima: equivalently set, the SOC
requires that or any extremum candidate to an equilibrium, the RHS in (4) must increase less than
the LHS.
FIGURE 1
 
p 
(G /g)(p) 
H(p) 
In FIGURE 1 (H(p) stands for the RHS in (4)), there exist three extrema, but the smallest
and the largest values only are two local minima while the intermediate one is a local maximum
Finally, substituting each value of the admissible minimum in L(s) provides us with the global
minimum, which is the way we implicitly proceed in proposition 1.
In order to understand the driving forces of the model, three benchmark models may be used.
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Benchmark 1 (Bebchuk, 1984):
The first one corresponds to Bebchuk’s seminal model, for which the equivalent to condition
(4) is (in (4), let us set ϕ(p) = p and σd = 1 = σp):
(
G
g
)
|pˆ
=
C
D
Inspection of (4) shows that in equilibrium it must be that σd
σp
pˆ
(
1− ϕ(σppˆ)
σdpˆ
)
+ C
σpD
> 0. Risk
aversion implies σppˆ > ϕ(σppˆ), but as σd < σp the sign of σdpˆ − ϕ(σppˆ) is ambiguous. Thus:
1− ϕ(σppˆ)
σdpˆ
 0, and it is surprising to find here that parties may prefer to settle their case despite
the gains of the negotiation are smaller than the transaction costs at trial. In other words, risk
aversion may both (and thus ambiguously) explain that the rate of trials is larger or smaller than
in Bebchuk’s seminal paper.
Benchmark 2 (Farmer and Pecorino, 2002):
The second one is the Plaintiff-informed version of the model proposed by Farmer and Pecorino
(2002), when parties are both risk neutral4 but display a self-serving bias; the condition equivalent
to (4) writes (in (4), let us set ϕ(p) = p)5 :
(
G
g
)
|pˆ
=
(
σd
σp
− 1
)
pˆ+
C
σpD
Knowing that σd < 1 < σp and thus by assumption:
σd
σp
− 1 < 0 and C
σpD
< C
D
, it is obvious
that, as it may be expected, the existence of litigants’ self-serving bias per se reduces the rate of
settlement (increases the frequency of trials) as compared to Bebchuk’s model. In the limit, as the
proponants of the "optimistic approach" of litigations explained (Shavell, 1982)), the optimism of
the parties may prevent them to reach a amicable settlement of their case, in the sense that a large
disagreement between litigants σd << 1 << σp may prevent a separating equilibrium to exist
6 -
for in case of a (sufficiently) large disagreement between litigants’ priors, then all cases go to trial
and neither are settled.
Benchmark 3:
4Farmer and Pecorino (2002) focus on the defendant as the informed party, and assume that the plaintiff has a
distorted perception of the defendant’s self-serving bias.
5Remark that the ambiguity concerning the role of σd obtained by Farmer and Pecorino (2002) disappears here
when the plaintiff is the informed party.
6Once more, for an interior separating equilibrium to exist, with some plaintiff’s types going to trial and the
others accepting the settlement offer, it must be that
(
σd
σp
− 1
)
pˆ+ C
D
> 0.
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The third and last benchmark model corresponds to a situation where parties have no self-
serving bias but where the plaintiff is risk averse; in such a case, we have the following FOC:
(
G
g
)
|pˆ
=
1
ϕ′(pˆ)
×
(
pˆ− ϕ(pˆ) +
C
D
)
with by the convexity assumption: pˆ − ϕ(pˆ) > 0. This means that risk aversion per se is
not an obstacle to the settlement of the case, and in fact increases the gains of the negotiation
(pˆ− ϕ(pˆ))D + C for the parties: now interestingly enough, the larger the divergence in their
perception of the risk at trial (the higher the difference pˆ − ϕ(pˆ)), the larger the gains of the
negotiation - and thus, the more likely the settlement of the case. However, given that ϕ′(σppˆ) ≷ 1,
risk aversion may either improve the impact of the gains of the negotiation (if ϕ′(pˆ) − 1 < 0) or
dampen them (when ϕ′(pˆ)− 1 > 0).
We investigate more precisely these effects and their meaning in the comparative statics part
of the paper.
3 Comparative statics
First, we focus on the role of fee-shifting. The consequences of each specific rule for the allocation
of the legal expenditures between parties may be easily obtained through a general specification.
Let us define as α is the proportion of the defendant’s costs borne by the plaintiff when the plaintiff
looses at trial with probability 1−pi; and similarly: β is the proportion of the plaintiff’s costs borne
by the defendant when the plaintiff wins at trial with probability pi. Several well known rules7
may be characterized as special cases of this general parametrization. The American rule where
each party simply bears its costs is obtained when α = β = 0. The British rule, for which the
party loosing at trial has to bear the aggregate costs of the trial, is the case where α = β = 1.
Finally, the French or Continental rule, where the judge has the discretionary power to transfer
to the loosing party to bear some kinds of the winner’s costs (what is called "depens" such as
taxes, expertises expenditures, but excluding attorney’s fees) corresponds to the situation where
α ∈ [0, 1] and β ∈ [0, 1]. The costs allocation rule is also a public information.
7See also Shavell (1982). The "proplaintiff" rule whereby the plaintiff bears no litigation costs when he wins but
only his own costs when he looses is obtained for α = 0 and β = 1. The symmetrical case of the "prodefendant"
rule holds for α = 1 and β = 0. Our parametrization is general enough to encompass also a greater variety of rules,
including the Marshall, Quayle and Matthew rules discussed in Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (2005) - which simply
requires to assume that α ∈ [0,∞) and β ∈ [0,∞).
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With the general parametrization of the fee-shifting rule, it can be shown that condition (4)
now writes:
(
G
g
)
|pˆ
=
1
ϕ′(σppˆ)
(
σd
σp
pˆ
(
1−
ϕ(σppˆ)
σdpˆ
)
+
1
σp
(
C
D+ βCp + αCd
))
(6)
Hence, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 2:
The rate of trial is the smallest under the American rule, the largest under the English rule,
and intermediate under the Continental rule.
Proof. Straightforward since all else held equal:
D
C
<
D + βCp + αCd
C
<
D +Cp +Cd
C
and according to (6), the larger C
D+βCp+αCd
, the higher pˆ and the smaller 1−G(pˆ). 
The result is the same in the three benchmak models.
Then, we study the impact of the individual optimistic biases and risk aversion.
Proposition 3:
I) The marginal plaintiff decreases (hence the probability of a trial increases) and the equilibrium
offer increases, with σp.
II) The marginal plaintiff increases (hence the probability of a trial decreases) but the equilibrium
demand may decrease or increase, with σd.
Proof. Given the SOC which requires the RHS to increase less than the LHS, it is easy to verify
that the RHS in (4) increases with σd but decreases with σp; hence the result, given that the LHS
in (4) increases with p. Differentiating (2), we obtain respectively:
dsˆ
dσd
= σdϕ
′(σppˆ)D
dpˆ
dσd
> 0
dsˆ
dσp
=
(
pˆ+ σp
dpˆ
dσp
)
ϕ′(σppˆ)D ≶ 0
The ambiguity with the variation of σp is explained by the effect on the marginal type, given
that: dpˆ
dσp
< 0. 
The defendant’s bias has a direct and positive effect on the gains of the negotiation. The
plaintiff’s bias has in contrast two negative effects: it decreases the efficiency of the separation
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through−g (pˆ) 1
σpϕ′(σppˆ)D
and it decreases the gains of the negotiation. It may be worth considering
the impact of risk aversion in this case on the first term; remark that:
d
dσp
(
1
σpϕ′(σppˆ)D
)
= −
1
σpϕ′(σppˆ)D
(
1
σp
+
ϕ′′(σppˆ)
ϕ′(σppˆ)
pˆ
)
< 0
showing that risk aversion increases in this case the impact of the plaintiff’s self-serving bias:
the larger the probabilistic aversion index ϕ
′′(σppˆ)
ϕ′(σppˆ)
pˆ, the larger the loss of efficiency in the separation
of types.
Proposition 3 I is consistent with, but Part II is in contradiction to Farmer and Pecorino (2002),
who found that the defendant’s self-serving bias has an ambiguous effect both on the probability
of trial and on the equilibrium settlement amount. This suggests at least that the specific way the
optimistic bias of the defendant affects the frequency of trials at equilibrium depends on the order
of play between the parties.
More generally, given that σp > 1 and σd < 1, proposition 3 means word by word that a rise
in σd corresponds to the case where the defendant becomes less optimistic: as σd increases, the
bias regarding his perception of the chances that the plaintiff prevails is reduced, and his own
assessment of the likelihood of winning becomes closer to the true probability. The symmetric
occurs for a rise in σp. Hence, this result in proposition 3 is exactly the one more usually obtained
in the "optimistic model" where litigants may fail to reach a settlement agreement when both
parties overestimate their chances at trial, the more optimistic they are the higher the likelihood
of a trial (Priest and Klein (1984), Waldfogel (1995,1998)).
We evaluate now the impact of shifts in the distribution of the plaintiff’s characteristics, either
(roughly speaking) a monotonic increase of its possible types, or a proportional spread of them.
The following property is usefull in the next proposition:
Property I: since ϕ is increasing and convex, with ϕ(0) = 0 and ϕ(1) = 1, there always exists
a q0 ∈]0, 1[ such that p ≥ q0 ⇒ ϕ′(p) ≥ 1, but p ≤ q0 ⇒ ϕ′(p) ≤ 1. In the next proposition, we
assume that q0 ∈]a, b[.
In other words, ϕ′(p) ≤ 1 means that risk aversion increases with plaintiff’s prior in the area
]0, q0[ (the distorsion of the probability p−ϕ(p) is enhanced); and in contrast, ϕ′(p) ≥ 1 means that
risk aversion increases with plaintiff’s prior in the domain ]q0, 1[ (respectively, the transformation
of the probability is dampened).
Proposition 4: An additive shift to the right in the range of plaintiff’s type:
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I) increases the marginal type. Moreover, it implies a less than proportional increase in the
marginal type if σppˆ > q0; otherwise, there may exist a more than proportional increase in the
marginal type.
II) increases the probability of trial if σppˆ > q0; otherwise, the probability of trial may decrease.
III) increases the equilibrium offer.
Proof. We define (see also Bebchuk (1984)) an additive shift to the right of the range of
plaintiff’s types as a t-translation of plaintiff’s types, such that p is now distributed in the interval
[a + t, b + t] (with t ≥ 0) with the cumulative Γ(p) and the density γ(p) satisfying the following
correspondances with the primitives G(p) and g(p):
Γ(p) = G(p− t)
γ(p) = g(p− t)
In fact, these two conditions characterize a family of distribution functions which is parame-
trized by t ≥ 0, where t = 0 gives us the primitives, and t > 0 leads to a distribution with a
higher mean type but having identical higher order moments. In this case, the condition (4) may
be substituted with the general formulation:
(
G
g
)
|(pˆ−t)
=
1
ϕ′(σppˆ)
(
σd
σp
pˆ
(
1−
ϕ(σppˆ)
σdpˆ
)
+
C
σpD
)
(7)
with pˆi = 1−G(pˆ− t) and sˆ given by (3). I) Differentiating (7) gives:
dpˆ
dt
=
1
Ω
(
G
g
)′
|(pˆ−t)
with: Ω ≡
(
G
g
)′
|(pˆ−t)
+
(
G
g
)
|(pˆ−t)
×
(
ϕ′′
ϕ′
)
|(σppˆ)
×σp+1−
1
ϕ′(σppˆ)
× σd
σp
> 0 according to the second
order condition. Thus, it is obvious that dpˆ
dt
> 0 since under assumption 2 the numerator is also
positive:
(
G
g
)′
|(pˆ−t)
> 0. Given that under assumption 1:
(
ϕ′′
ϕ′
)
|(σppˆ)
> 0, then σppˆ > q0 ⇒
dpˆ
dt
< 1;
in contrast, if σppˆ < q0 then
dpˆ
dt
≷ 1. II) As a result pˆi = 1−G(pˆ− t) increases with t if σppˆ > q0.
Otherwise, the effect is ambiguous. III) Given that the marginal type increases with t, it is also
straightforward to see that the equilibrium offer sˆ = ϕ(σppˆ)D−Cp also increases with t. 
We may also consider an alternative definition of the expansion of plaintiff’s type. In the next
proposition, we denoted: µ = E(p) the mean type of the plaintiff.
Proposition 5. A mean-preserving proportional shift in the range of plaintiff’s type:
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I) decreases the marginal type if pˆ < µ; otherwise, the effect is ambiguous;
II) has an ambiguous effect on the probability of trial;
III) decreases (increases) the equilibrium offer if the marginal type decreases (respectively, in-
creases).
Proof. We define (see also Bebchuk (1984)) a mean-preserving proportional shift in the range
of plaintiff’s types as the composition of an additive shift to the left (a µ(1− t)-translation, with
t ≥ 1 and µ = E(p)) plus a multiplicative shift of plaintiff’s types, such that p is now distributed in
the interval [ta+µ(1− t), tb+ µ(1− t)] with a cumulative probability function Γ(p) and a density
γ(p) satisfying the following correspondances with the primitives G(p) and g(p):
Γ(p) = G
(
p− µ
t
+ µ
)
γ(p) =
1
t
g
(
p− µ
t
+ µ
)
Once more, these two conditions characterize a family of distribution functions which is para-
metrized by t ≥ 1, where t = 1 gives us the primitives, and t > 1 gives us a new distribution with
the same mean µ = E(p) but which is more spread than the primitive distribution; thus it has
moments of higher orders which are larger than those of the primitive. In this case, the condition
(4) may be now substituted with the general formulation:
t×
(
G
g
)
|( p−µt +µ)
=
1
ϕ′(σppˆ)
(
σd
σp
pˆ
(
1−
ϕ(σppˆ)
σdpˆ
)
+
C
σpD
)
(8)
with pˆi = 1−G
(
pˆ−µ
t
+ µ
)
. I) Differentiating (8) gives:
dpˆ
dt
=
1
Ω
×
[(
G
g
)′
|( pˆ−µt +µ)
×
(
pˆ− µ
t
)
−
(
G
g
)
|( pˆ−µt +µ)
]
It is obvious that pˆ < µ ⇒ dpˆ
dt
< 0 although if pˆ > µ then dpˆ
dt
has an ambiguous sign. II)
Similarly, pˆi may decrease or increase with t since:
dpˆi
dt
= −
1
t
× g
(
pˆ− µ
t
+ µ
)
×
(
dpˆ
dt
−
pˆ− µ
t
)
Hence the result. III) Given the ambiguity on the marginal type, it is also straightforward to
see that the equilibrium offer sˆ = ϕ(σpˆ)D−Cp may as well increase (if the marginal type increases)
as decrease (respectively if the marginal type decreases) with t. 
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Both propositions 4 and 5 give predictions concerning the effects of such shifts in the range
of possible types for the plaintiff8 which are different as compared to those of Bebchuk (1984).
For Bebchuk, the additive shift has no effect on the frequency of trial and a positive effect on
the settlement offer, while the mean-preserving proportional shift increase the likelihood of a trial
and has an ambiguous effect on the amount for which the parties settle. To be short, our results
suggest that any definition of expansion in the range of unobservable types have effects on the
equilibrium when parties are optimistically biased and/or risk averse; however these consequences
may be quite imprecise.
At the same time, it is worth noticing that the effects we obtain here are also different from
those predicted by the “optimistic model”; to see this, we can interpret the mean-preserving
proportional shift in the range of plaintiff’s types as representing, from the defendant point of
view, more variability in the prediction of plaintiff’s type (less precision in the assessments of
the true value for the plaintiff’s chances of prevailing) since it corresponds to more dispersion in
plaintiff’s possible types. Then, let us remind that Priest and Klein (1984) and Waldfogel (1998)
showed that when the errors made by the litigants in predicting the outcome at trial increase, then
the likelihood of a trial increases: this is because the chances are raised that plaintiff’s optimistic
estimate of prevailing at trial be larger than defendant’s one.
Finally, we investigate the impact of more risk aversion for the plaintiff. According to Yaari
(1987), a plaintiff having a probability transformation function ψ is more risk averse than a plaintiff
characterized by ϕ iff ψ is a positive and convex transformation of ϕ. This implies that for all p:
ψ(σp) < ϕ(σp) (Roëll (1987)). This also introduces a usefull property used in the next proposition:
Property II: since ψ and ϕ are both (strictly) increasing and (strictly) convex, such that for
all p: ψ(σp) < ϕ(σp) and with ψ(0) = ϕ(0) = 0 and ψ(1) = ϕ(1) = 1, then: 1 < ψ′(0) < ϕ′(0)
but ψ′(1) > ϕ′(1) > 1. By continuity, there always exists a (unique) q1 ∈]0, 1[ such that p ≥ q1 ⇒
ψ′(p) ≥ ϕ′(p), but p ≤ q1 ⇒ ψ
′(p) < ϕ′(p). In the following, we assume that q1 ∈]a, b[.
Proposition 6: If the plaintiff becomes more risk averse, then:
I) the marginal plaintiff increases (hence the probability of trial decreases) if σppˆ < q1; otherwise
the effect is ambiguous.
II) the equilibrium offer may increase or decrease. Specifically, it decreases if the marginal
plaintiff decreases, otherwise, the effect is ambiguous.
8 In the model of Bebchuk (1984) where the private information is p, it does not matter whether the informed
party is the defendant or the plaintiff for the analysis of such shifts in the range of unobservable types.
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Proof. Assume that plaintiff ψ is more risk averse than plaintiff ϕ. I) As a result, since
ψ(σpp)
σdp
<
ϕ(σpp)
σdp
meaning that when the plaintiff becomes more risk averse, the RHS in (4) increases du to
the gains of the negotiation which are raized all else held equal. Moreover, if ψ′(σpp) < ϕ
′(σpp),
then the efficiency of the separation between plaintiffs’ types is also improved. Thus, if σppˆ < q1,
the RHS globally increases meaning an increase in the marginal plaintiff. In contrast, remark that
if σppˆ > q1 which may imply (necessary but not sufficient) ψ
′(σpp) > ϕ′(σpp), then this second
effect dampen the influence of the first one, such that the net effect on the RHS of (4) is ambiguous.
II) When the plaintiff becomes more risk averse, then there are two effects on the equilibrium
offer: all else held equal, the anticipated utility of the marginal plaintiff decreases, which allows
the defendant to reduce his offer; on the second, the type of the marginal plaintiff may increase or
decrease. Hence the result. 
The observation that an increase in the risk aversion may have an ambiguous effect on the
predicted behavior of an individual is not a new result and has led to a lot of literature in insurance
economics, portfolio choices and so on (see Ross (1981)). What is really new here is that the
comparative statics of risk aversion depends on σpˆ the initial prior of the marginal plaintiff and the
way it affects the distorsion of probability. Consider the situation where the marginal plaintiff is
weakly biased and assesses a small prior for his chances of prevailing in the sense that σpˆ  q1; then
according to proposition 6, as he becomes more sensible to risk (more risk averse) such a plaintiff
will be prone to settle the case as will do too some of the near-to-the-marginal-plaintiff individuals
who previously prefer to go in front of the court. In contrast, when he marginal plaintiff is highly
biased in the sense that σpˆ > q1 then an increase in risk aversion on the one hand suggests that
more plaintiffs accept to settle their case, and on the second that they become less sensible to the
probability of prevaling implies that more plaintiffs may go to trial.
4 Discussion and conclusion
Law and Economics scholars have to take into consideration the interpretation of legal norms by
the courts. It is precisely because the meaning of a norm needs always to be reconstructed by
the judiciary that conflict may arises. What we call interpretation in law is the other face of the
cognitive problem for the parties to assess the probability he will win the case. As litigation results
from divergent interpretations of the legal aspects of the case, parties diverge in their expectations
about the chance to win. We consider that interpretational issues in law are the twin aspect of
cognitive aspect in economics. In this paper, we have considered a self-serving bias to capture
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the fact that interpretation is never clear and that parties may fail to perfectly interpret the law.
The problem is different from those considered in “strategic models” because the problem is not
with symmetries of information between litigants but with the interpretative mechanism of the
courts. It also contribute to clarify the traditional “optimistic models”. The reason is quite clear.
In the optimistic approach, the reason why parties could present optimistic believes is exogeneous.
The origins of optimism are not developed by authors who prefer to refer in general terms to
informational advantages. Our main result is that the introduction of cognitive biases in the
model contribute to clarify the debate.
In our paper, we observe that the defendant’s self-serving bias has an ambiguous effect both on
the probability of trial and on the equilibrium settlement amount. The paper also suggests that
the specific way the optimistic bias of the defendant affects the frequency of trials at equilibrium
depends on the organization of the trial, particularly on the parties’ order of appearance. Moeover,
the model contributes to explain the role of risk aversion. Specifically, the model demonstrates
that the effect of risk aversion depends on the initial prior of the plaintiff and the way it affects the
distorsion of probability. These results are promising because they contribute to explain that the
believes about the result of the trial are not sufficient by themselves to understand the behaviors of
litigants. As suggested by legal theory, the confidence the parties have in their believes is probably
more important. The reason is that litigants develop opinions about the interpretation of the law
to be applied to their case by the judges. In doing this, they necessarily express an attitude towards
the risk to commit a "mistake". This is the reason why the question of confidence is so important.
Our conclusion has also normative implications. If the problem of confidence is negligible, the
conclusions of the "optimistic" models develop by Posner or Landes are completely verified and
the legal policies built on these hypothesis are probably well designed. However, if the problem
of confidence and the aversion for mistakes are important, the conclusions of the model are more
ambiguous and the normative problems are more complicated to solve.
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